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Bacterial infections are prototypical emerg-
ing diseases (1), and their recent history
challenges the premature view that the battle
against infectious diseases had been won. In the
last 25 years, disease caused by multidrug-
resistant  Streptococcus pneumoniae became
established on several continents, reaching the
United States by the 1990s (2-4), and fatal
infections caused by S. pyogenes (group A
Streptococcus), a problem of the 19th century (5),
have returned in toxic and necrotic forms (6). By
the 1970s, group B Streptococcus replaced gram-
negative bacteria and Staphylococcus aureus as
the leading cause of sepsis in newborns (7,8).
Researchers tackled the public health challenge
of developing vaccines to protect children against
the major causes of bacterial meningitis:
Haemophilus influenzae type b, S. pneumoniae,
and Neisseria meningitidis (9,10). A critical step
for response to microbial adaptation is establish-
ing a reliable tracking system. We describe
active, population-based surveillance for serious
bacterial infections that was established by the
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Active Bacterial Core surveillance (ABCs) is a collaboration between the Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention and several state health departments and
universities participating in the Emerging Infections Program Network. ABCs conducts
population-based active surveillance, collects isolates, and performs studies of invasive
disease caused by Streptococcus pneumoniae, group A and group B Streptococcus,
Neisseria meningitidis, and Haemophilus influenzae for a population of  17 to 30 million.
These pathogens caused an estimated 97,000 invasive cases, resulting in 10,000
deaths in the United States in 1998.  Incidence rates of these pathogens are described.
During 1998, 25% of invasive pneumococcal infections in ABCs areas were not
susceptible to penicillin, and 13.3% were not susceptible to three classes of antibiotics.
In 1998, early-onset group B streptococcal disease had declined by 65% over the
previous 6 years. More information on ABCs is available at www.cdc.gov/ncidod/dbmd/
abcs. ABCs specimens will soon be available to researchers through an archive.93 Vol. 7, No. 1, January–February 2001 Emerging Infectious Diseases
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(CDC) as part of its response to emerging
infectious diseases (11,12).
Active Bacterial Core surveillance (ABCs)
was designed to estimate the burden of
community-acquired invasive bacterial infec-
tions that typically manifest as sepsis and
meningitis. The system determines incidence
and trends of these diseases in a multistate
population and uses molecular and microbiologic
methods to characterize the organisms causing
infection. As prevention strategies against some
pathogens are used routinely (9,13,14), ABCs
evaluates their impact and identifies missed
opportunities for their application.  Established
in four states in 1995, ABCs now operates within
the eight states of the Emerging Infections
Program (EIP) network, representing a popula-
tion of more than 30 million and ascertaining
cases from more than 600 clinical microbiology
laboratories. A ninth EIP state, Colorado, initiated
ABCs during 2000. ABCs currently focuses on
surveillance and special studies related to five
pathogens:  S. pneumoniae,  H. influenzae,  N.
meningitidis, group A Streptococcus (S. pyogenes),
and group B Streptococcus (S. agalactiae).
ABCs’ predecessor was the active surveil-
lance program for invasive bacterial diseases
established in 1988 (also sponsored by CDC),
which evaluated the efficacy of H. influenzae type
b vaccines in infants (15), identified dietary risk
factors for sporadic listeriosis (16,17), and
compared the cost-effectiveness of strategies for
preventing group B streptococcal disease in
newborns (18). ABCs has expanded the scope of
targeted conditions to address additional emerg-
ing infections such as necrotizing fasciitis (the so-
called flesh-eating disease) and streptococcal
toxic-shock syndrome, both severe manifesta-
tions of disease caused by group A Streptococcus.
ABCs also now monitors the emergence of drug
resistance in the community-acquired pathogen
S. pneumoniae. ABCs is one of three core
activities conducted by  EIPs; the others are
FoodNet (19) and the Unexplained Critical
Illness and Death Project (20). This article, a
progress report of the first 5 years of the EIP
network’s ABCs project, identifies easily acces-
sible resources from this system for public health
and infectious disease constituencies.
ABCs Methods
In 1999, ABCs was conducted in Connecticut
as well as in part or all of the following states:
California, Georgia, Maryland, Minnesota, New
York, Oregon, and Tennessee (Figure 1). (For
certain pathogens, surveillance is conducted
statewide in Georgia, Maryland, Minnesota,
and Oregon).  The total population under
surveillance in 1998 ranged from approxi-
mately 17.4 million for S. pneumoniae to 30.4
million for N. meningitidis.
A case is defined as isolation of one of the five
pathogens from a usually sterile site (e.g., blood,
cerebrospinal fluid, pleural fluid) in a resident of
one of the surveillance areas. Detailed methods of
case-finding, data collection, and laboratory
audits conducted within ABCs have been
described (10,21). The key features are active
ascertainment of cases by state-based surveil-
lance officers, who make regular contact with
microbiology or infection control practitioners in
all clinical microbiology laboratories processing
sterile site cultures for the surveillance area;
collection of isolates of the specified pathogens for
laboratory testing by ABCs personnel (Table 1);
and semiannual audits of all participating
laboratories to identify missed cases. Because the
surveillance is population-based and cases
identified by audits are included in the final
database, ABCs data are used to monitor
incidence of these diseases in a large, defined
population. With the use of race- and age-
adjustment, ABCs data also permit annual
projections of the estimated incidence as well as
the estimated number of cases and deaths
occurring in the entire United States. For
national projections, cases with unknown race
Figure 1. States included in Active Bacterial Core
surveillance in 1999. Surveillance for all pathogens
was conducted statewide in Connecticut but in
selected counties only for some or all pathogens in the
other states.94 Emerging Infectious Diseases Vol. 7, No. 1, January–February 2001
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are distributed by area, on the basis of reported
race distribution for known cases within eight age
categories. U.S. census data for counties under
surveillance and natality data on live births are the
sources of denominators for incidence calculations;
the most recent year’s population data available
with age and race information at the county level
are used for rate calculations.
Core surveillance activities include collecting
epidemiologic and clinical data and characteriz-
ing isolates in terms of antimicrobial susceptibil-
ity, serotype or serogroup, and subtyping. ABCs
also conducts special studies that use the
surveillance infrastructure but require collection
of additional data by chart review, patient
interviews, or analysis of ABCs data together
with complementary data sources. ABCs uses the
following indicators to monitor performance:
sensitivity of >90% for active surveillance (based
on total cases detected by surveillance and the
laboratory audit); collection of >85% of isolates
from cases; and enrollment of 90% of eligible
participants into special studies.
ABCs is overseen by a steering committee
consisting of CDC and state EIP representatives
as well as external advisors from the public
health, infectious disease, and microbiology
fields. These parties convey views from key
constituents and annually evaluate the need to
add or subtract pathogens for surveillance. In
1999, CDC’s National Center for Infectious
Diseases awarded $10.7 million through coopera-
tive agreements to eight EIP states; approxi-
mately $2.5 million (23%) of these funds
supported ABCs-related activities.
Results
Surveillance Highlights
In 1998, 6,992 cases of invasive disease
caused by the five pathogens were reported from
the eight sites. The rates of invasive disease (per
100,000) ranged from 1.0 for N. meningitidis to
24.1 for S. pneumoniae (Table 2). An estimated
97,000 invasive infections and 10,000 deaths per
year in the United States are due to
S. pneumoniae, group A and B streptococci,
Table 1. Laboratory characterization of isolates collected
as part of the Active Bacterial Core surveillance program
Pathogen Test(s)
Group A Streptococcus emm- and T-typing for all
invasive isolates; antimi-
crobial susceptibility
testing of periodic samples
Group B Streptococcus Serotyping and antimicro-
bial susceptibility testing
of  isolates for selected
surveillance areas
Haemophilus influenzae Serotyping of all isolates
(a-f); molecular subtyping
of isolates as part of
special projects
Neisseria meningitidis Molecular subtyping of
isolates in  conjunction
with vaccine development;
antimicrobial resistance
on isolates periodically
Streptococcus pneumoniae Antimicrobial suscepti-
bility testing for all
invasive isolates;
serotyping on all invasive
isolates since January 1,
1998; subtyping of a
sample of isolates using
genotyping methods
Table 2. Incidence, case-fatality ratio, projected U.S. cases and deaths, and proportion nonsusceptible to penicillin of
invasive disease identified in the Active Bacterial Core surveillance (ABCs), 1998
     Group A      Group B Haemophilus    Neisseria Streptococcus
 Streptococcus  Streptococcus   influenzae meningitidis  pneumoniae
Aggregate incidencea     3.8     6.5     1.4     1.0    24.1
Range by areaa 2.6 - 4.1 4.8 - 8.5 1.1 - 2.3 0.6 - 2.0 20.0-28.9
Case- fatality ratio   12.2%    9.5 %   13.9%    13.7%     9.3%
  in ABCs areas
Projected U.S. cases 10,200 17,400   3,900   2,500   63,000
Projected U.S. deaths   1,300   1,700      500      400     6,100
Penicillin nonsusceptibilityb     0     0      - -    1.1%    25.0%
aIncidence = cases per 100,000.
bNonsusceptible includes isolates classified as either intermediate or resistant to penicillin. Results reflect testing of group A
streptococcal isolates from 1997 (n=183) and group B streptococcal isolates from 1997 and 1998 combined (n=188).95 Vol. 7, No. 1, January–February 2001 Emerging Infectious Diseases
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H. influenzae, and N. meningitidis. Despite
continued availability of effective antimicrobial
agents for each pathogen, approximately 1 in 10
cases results in death (Table 2). Substantial
geographic variation exists in the incidence of
invasive infections caused by each pathogen
(Table 2). Among invasive S. pneumoniae
infections, the proportion caused by drug-
resistant organisms was three times higher in
some areas than others (4); 8.4% of invasive
pneumococci from New York were fully resistant
to penicillin (MIC >2.0), while 25.4% of isolates
from Tennessee were penicillin resistant. No
penicillin-nonsusceptible (intermediate or resis-
tant) strains of group A or group B Streptococcus
have been detected to date.
Recent temporal changes are most dramatic
for invasive group B streptococcal disease among
infants less than 1 week old (i.e., early-onset
disease), which declined 65% from 1993 to 1998
(Figure 2), during a period when the incidence of
disease in older infants and adults remained
stable (22). Data from ABCs provide a reliable
standard for evaluating alternative methods for
surveillance of drug resistance in S. pneumoniae,
including sentinel surveillance methods (4) and
use of aggregate data from antibiograms from
multiple hospitals (23). The recent emergence of
serogroup Y meningococci, demonstrated by ABCs,
suggests that vaccine companies should consider
incorporating serogroup Y in new meningococcal
vaccines. In addition, the diversity in the outer
membrane proteins of serogroup B meningococ-
cal strains suggests that vaccines against these
proteins may not be efficient means of preventing
endemic serogroup B meningococcal disease.
Applied Research
The population-based collections of isolates
from ABCs are used to evaluate subtyping
methods (24), identify genetic mechanisms of
antimicrobial resistance, determine vaccine
formulations (25,26), and assess capsular
switching among organisms (for vaccines based
on capsular types) (27,28). ABCs has identified
population-based risk factors for disease in
various age groups (Table 3). A case-control study
of invasive pneumococcal disease in young
children showed that attendance at day care was
associated with a substantial attributable risk for
disease (29). A similar study of invasive
pneumococcal disease in 18- to 64-year-old adults
who were not immunocompromised identified
active and passive smoking, in addition to
household contact with a child in day care, as
independent risk factors for disease (30). Models
of age- and serogroup- or serotype-specific rates
of invasive meningococcal and pneumococcal
disease in the ABCs population have compared
the potential impact of diverse immunization
strategies for meningococcal and combined
meningococcal-pneumococcal vaccines on disease
prevention (32). The increased risk for pneumo-
nia death occurring several days after illness
onset associated with antimicrobial-resistant
strains of S. pneumoniae was demonstrated by
using multistate clinical and epidemiologic data
from ABCs (33).
Figure 2. Invasive
group B streptococ-
cal disease in in-
fants less than 1
week of age per
1,000 live births
and in adults >65
years of age per
100,000 population,
Active Bacterial
Core surveillance,
1993-1998 (adapted
from ref. 22).96 Emerging Infectious Diseases Vol. 7, No. 1, January–February 2001
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Infrastructure
ABCs provides participating state health
departments active contact with all acute-care
hospitals and reference microbiology laborato-
ries in the surveillance area. This network
provides an infrastructure for public health
communication and education, as well as a
network of key contacts available for response to
new or emerging concerns. Periodic surveys of
laboratories within ABCs determined the
adequacy of methods used to detect group B
Streptococcus from prenatal screening specimens
(34), the computerization of clinical microbiology
laboratories and readiness for electronic labora-
tory-based reporting, and the routine procedures
used by ABCs laboratories to detect antimicrobial
resistance among S. pneumoniae, S. aureus, and
several other organisms (35). ABCs and other
EIP personnel have provided assistance with
multistate response efforts to determine the
burden of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (36) and
contributed to efforts to determine the rate of
rotavirus vaccine-related intussusception (37).
Further, the presence of ABCs personnel in state
health departments and academic institutions
has strengthened communication links required
for accurate reporting and feedback.
Prevention
Since publication of consensus guidelines for
the prevention of group B streptococcal disease in
newborns, ABCs assessed the implementation of
prevention practices and identified opportunities
for preventing more cases. ABCs showed that
hospital obstetric programs’ adoption of policies
to prevent group B streptococcal infection
increased significantly (38) and that hospitals
that had adopted or revised a policy in 1996 had
significantly fewer cases in 1997 (39). ABCs is
also tracking the characteristics of newborn
group B streptococcal cases that continue to occur
despite prevention guidelines to determine
whether these represent failures of intrapartum
antibiotic prophylaxis or failure to offer such
prophylaxis to mothers at risk. In several EIPs,
pilot prevention programs are in place to identify
efficient ways to reduce the incidence of disease
caused by ABCs pathogens. These include a
multifaceted program to reduce inappropriate
antibiotic use in the Baltimore metropolitan area
and efforts to promote pneumococcal polysaccha-
ride vaccine in populations at high risk in
Rochester, New York; Minneapolis-St. Paul,
Minnesota; metropolitan Atlanta, Georgia; and
Portland, Oregon. The Connecticut and Minne-
sota health departments conducted demonstra-
tion projects that integrated prevention of
group B streptococcal disease into routine
perinatal  care, building on successes with
hepatitis B perinatal prevention programs and
contributing to reduction of perinatal HIV
transmission (40,41).
Discussion
Nearly 100,000 invasive infections and
10,000 deaths caused by ABCs pathogens occur
annually in the United States. Because few states
routinely collect data and isolates for all of these
infections, ABCs helps monitor disease and
evaluate prevention programs at the national
level. ABCs has now developed robust estimates
of the magnitude of disease and deaths attributable
to the five invasive pathogens (Table 2). A
number of future priorities have been identified
Table 3. Population-based risk factors for invasive disease, identified by Active Bacterial Core surveillance
      Age group, Factors associated with increased
Pathogen      other criteria    risk by multivariate analysis      References
Streptococcus pneumoniae       <5 years old Child-care attendance, underlying         29
  conditions, lack of breast-feeding,
  household crowding
    18-64 years old, Active or passive smoke exposure,         30
     not immuno-   black race, chronic diseases, household
     compromised   contact with child in day care
Neisseria meningitidis          All ages Active or passive smoke exposure,         31
  underlying conditions, steroid use,
  attendance at new school
Group B Streptococcus       <7 days old Black race, low birth weight,  CDC, unpub.
  maternal age <20 years        data97 Vol. 7, No. 1, January–February 2001 Emerging Infectious Diseases
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that take advantage of the careful characteriza-
tion of isolates associated with invasive infection.
Licensure and introduction of a seven-valent
conjugate vaccine against S. pneumoniae neces-
sitate evaluation of the impact of this new
prevention tool on target populations (Table 4).
Of particular interest will be evaluating whether
indirect effects similar to those seen with the Hib
vaccine (42) occur. The large birth cohort under
surveillance through ABCs and the longitudinal
data on both early-onset cases and hospital
policies for disease prevention offer the opportu-
nity to compare the two alternative strategies for
group B streptococcal prevention (screening-
based vs. risk-based) through two studies during
the next few years. ABCs will continue to
contribute to tracking progress in Hib elimina-
tion, monitor for emergence of other serotypes of
H. influenzae, and provide data on strain-specific
disease (e.g., serotype, serogroup, outer mem-
brane type). Such information is valuable for
evaluating new vaccines for group B Streptococ-
cus and serogroup B meningococcus. ABCs data
will also be used to define clusters of invasive
group A streptococcal disease and to model the
impact of possible strategies and new formula-
tions of pneumococcal vaccines targeted against
pneumococcal pneumonia in adults (Figure 3) as
well as vaccines targeted against invasive group
A Streptococcus syndromes.
The molecular biology revolution and im-
proved understanding of host-pathogen interac-
tions offer great potential to advance knowledge
about ABCs bacteria. Emerging antimicrobial
resistance and other forms of pathogen adapta-
tion (e.g., capsular switching) lend an urgency to
such research. Specimens from invasive disease
surveillance represent well-characterized, popu-
lation-based collections with relevant clinical and
demographic information. These provide a
valuable resource for basic and applied research
focused on issues as varied as new drug and
vaccine development, evaluation of mechanisms
of virulence and antimicrobial resistance, and
genetic research. ABCs is planning to make these
strains available to outside researchers and
industry through a preserved collection. Such a
specimen bank could provide a lasting legacy of
the work of hundreds of infection control
practitioners, clinical microbiology laboratories,
and ABCs surveillance collaborators.
To ensure that ABCs’ lessons learned within
the EIP network reach other public health
constituents, a number of efforts are under way.
Additional details of the surveillance system and
outreach materials are available at http://
www.cdc.gov/ncidod/dbmd/abcs. Other educa-
tional materials are available at http://
www.cdc.gov/ncidod/dbmd/gbs and at http://
www.cdc.gov/ncidod/dbmd/antibioticresistance.
For laboratories evaluating new strains of group
A Streptococcus, genetic sequencing data of all
strains described thus far are also available on
the web. A similar site for meningococcal isolates
is under development.
Conclusions
ABCs is a model of collaboration between
public health and academia. The system provides
reliable data that can be used to address critical
public health concerns, improve understanding
of emerging infections, and help prevent the
consequences of these infections. While the
past 5 years have helped quantify the
magnitude of disease caused by these patho-
gens and document increasing antibiotic
resistance in some of them, the future provides
several challenges. To remain a vital component
Table 4. Future priorities for Active Bacterial Core
surveillance (ABCs) project
1. Define invasive group A Streptococcus clusters.
2. Determine effectiveness of screening vs. risk-
based prevention strategies for perinatal group
B streptococcal disease.
3. Determine feasibility of eliminating invasive
disease caused by Haemophilus influenzae type b.
4. Quantify culture-negative, polymerase chain
reaction-positive meningitis.
5. Measure direct and indirect effects of
introducing a seven-valent pneumococcal
conjugate vaccine.
Figure 3. Age-specific incidence (per 100,000) and
case-fatality ratio (percent) of invasive pneumococcal
disease, Active Bacterial Core surveillance, 1998.98 Emerging Infectious Diseases Vol. 7, No. 1, January–February 2001
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in the nation’s efforts to prevent and control
emerging infectious diseases, ABCs will need to
incorporate surveillance and research tools of the
21st century, including electronic laboratory-
based reporting, genotyping of pathogens, and
improved communication to promote behavioral
change and adoption of practice guidelines.
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